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FOREWORD

This monograph provides an appraisal of the ability of
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to build a credible
military force in the 21st century. The author, Colonel Larry
M. Wortzel, examines a complicated set of factors, which
when taken together, equates to potential military power in
China’s case.
Perhaps foremost among these factors is the PRC’s
current economic success and whether Beijing can transfer
it to the military sphere. Colonel Wortzel concludes that
China could become a military power in every sense, but the
greater likelihood is that the PRC will be overcome by
internal problems. Nonetheless, the growth in China’s
military potential bears careful watching by U.S. military
planners.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Acting Director of Research
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is seen by many as
an economic powerhouse with the world’s largest standing
military that has the potential to translate economic power
into the military sphere. As one of the elements of power, a
nation’s military potential is based not only on its capability
to defeat an adversary, but also its ability to coerce and
exercise influence.
China’s standing armed force of some 2.8 million active
soldiers in uniform is the largest military force in the world.
Approximately 1 million reservists and some 15 million
militia back them up. With a population of over 1.2 billion
people, China also has a potential manpower base of
another 200 million males fit for military service available
at any time. In addition to this wealth of manpower, China
is a nuclear power. It has enough megatonnage, missiles,
and bombers to hit the United States, Europe, its Asian
neighbors, and Russia. Notwithstanding the recent
detargeting announcement between China and the United
States, that does not change China’s capability to hold Los
Angeles or other U.S. cities hostage to nuclear threat.
China is also an economic power of considerable
strength. The PRC’s economy quadrupled in the 15 years up
to 1995. The latest World Bank report on its economy, China
2020, indicates that China’s gross domestic product (GDP)
increased at a rate of between 6.6 percent and 8 percent
annually between 1978 and 1995. And China has foreign
exchange reserves of about U.S.$140.6 billion, primarily
from foreign direct investment.
For China’s leaders, the economy is the most important
factor determining future military power. The director of
the political department of the People’s Liberation Army’s
(PLA) Guangzhou Military Region described national
power as a combination of economic strength and the “level
v

of defense modernization.” Chinese leaders believe that
economic growth will stagnate if resources are poured into
military modernization at the expense of broader economic
development.
There are many serious problems for China’s leaders to
confront if they are to maintain healthy economic growth.
Among the issues are an aging population, state owned
enterprises (SOE) operating at a loss (50 percent), potential
labor unrest, and potential financial crisis.
If China is to continue on its current path of economic
integration, the central leadership must remain linked to
the international economy. It also means that domestic
stability must be ensured because no foreign country or
banking house will invest in an unstable political environment. When Chinese military and civilian leaders claim
that their priority is economic growth and stability, they
mean it; the primary mission of the PLA and the People’s
Armed Police (PAP) is internal security and stability. To a
large extent, the PLA has had to postpone its mission of
external defense. In the short term, Beijing is distracted
from a serious military buildup by problems that are
resource-demanding. At this stage, and aware that the
collapse of the Soviet Union occurred when Moscow
attempted to win the arms race against the West, the PLA is
prepared to remain under-resourced. To compensate,
China’s military leaders are working to develop the
capability to control sea lines of communication, project
regional force, and deter the United States and other
potential adversaries in creative ways without matching
forces.

vi

CHINA’S MILITARY POTENTIAL

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is seen by many as
an economic powerhouse with the world’s largest standing
military that has the potential to translate economic power
into the military sphere. As one of the elements of national
power, a nation’s military potential is an abstract value. It is
based not only on its capability to defeat an adversary, but
also its indirect ability to coerce and exercise influence.
Potential military power is derived from a complicated set of
factors including the numbers and types of forces; level of
economic development; technological characteristics of
weapons and equipment; discipline; morale; training;
combat experience; command, control and leadership;
geography; industrial capacity; national resources; and the
national will to apply power.1 If this power is not applied, it
is of no value. 2 Any consideration of the future military
potential of a power like China, therefore, is serious
business that requires a cold, sober assessment of the
likelihood that, if Beijing’s economic success continues, it
will be translated into improvements in the military
sphere.3 This monograph will touch on a few of these factors
in an attempt to characterize the likely military potential of
China in the 21st century.4
China’s standing armed force of some 2.8 million active
soldiers in uniform is the largest military force in the world.
Approximately 1 million reservists and some 15 million
militia members back them up. This manpower alone
makes the PRC a very significant military power. With a
population of 1.2 billion people, China also has a potential
manpower base of another 200 million males fit for military
service available at any time. In addition to this wealth of
manpower, China is a nuclear power. While some may
classify China’s strategic nuclear forces as “minimal,”
Beijing has enough megatonnage, missiles, and bombers to
hit the United States, Europe, China’s Asian neighbors, and
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Russia. 5 Notwithstanding the July 1998 de-targeting
announcement between the United States and China, that
does not change China’s capability to hold Los Angeles or
other U.S. cities hostage to nuclear threat.6
China is also an economic power of considerable
strength. The PRC’s economy quadrupled in the 15 years
before 1995. According to the latest World Bank report on
its economy, China 2020, China’s gross domestic product
(GDP) increased at a rate of between 6.6 percent and 8
percent annually between 1978 and 1995.7 And China has
foreign exchange reserves of about $123 billion today,
primarily from foreign direct investment in the Chinese
economy.8
There is a continuum of viewpoints regarding China’s
future. From an alarmist perspective, some analysts predict
that China’s size and economic power will necessarily lead
to a clash between Chinese and American interests in the
future. The most alarmist of these writers, Richard
Bernstein and Ross Munro, are convinced that China is on
the way to “Asian hegemony” so that “no country in the
region . . . will act without taking China’s interests into
prime consideration.”9 David Shambaugh, in an article in
The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, presents a
different argument.10 Using a linguistic “deconstruction
analysis” of the Chinese term for hegemony (Ba Chuan),
Shambaugh analyzes its “archaeology,” to paraphrase
Michel Foucault. Shambaugh argues that China is not a
hegemonic state. He shows a sophisticated understanding
of the Chinese language in his argument. However, this
linguistic deconstruction of the Chinese term for hegemony
means nothing to those countries that are directly
threatened by China’s military might. Mongolia, India,
Vietnam, and the various other claimants to the Spratly
Islands, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, and Burma
understand very well what hegemony means. It is the
ability to coerce and exercise influences based on the
capability to back policy up with force, and China is a
hegemonic power for these states and territories.11
2

Francis A. Lees, in a 1997 book on China, argues that
four factors are present that make China a superpower now:
“a large, diversified national economy; a major conventional
military force; a strategic nuclear arsenal; and a strategic
geographic location.”12 Lees is wrong in my view. China is
not a superpower. The PLA’s conventional military force
cannot project itself beyond China’s periphery; the economy
is fragile; the location is geostrategic in a continental sense,
but regionally and in a global sense only if China can project
sufficient naval force; and the nuclear arsenal is a minimal
deterrent. Lees really gets at the potential for becoming a
superpower; his argument that China is a superpower is not
accepted by many of those who “watch China.”
Gerald Segal, a veteran Sinologist, for instance, argues
in the April 17, 1998, edition of the New Statesman that
China is not an important country. It is a “fragile state,”
according to Segal, that can’t project its power and may not
be able to do so for a “decade or two.”13 American military
planners and strategists think in longer terms than Segal.
They look 25 to 30 years out, covering roughly the same time
frame as this monograph.14 Even without a “cold war,” the
potential for a clash of interests between the United States
and another projected “superpower” such as China leads to
forecasts, which translate into plans, strategies and
requirements for military equipment and manpower. These
analyses are part of the national force building process in
the United States.
NATIONAL STRATEGY: BUY TIME, STRENGTHEN
THE ECONOMY, BUILD POWER
For China’s leaders, the economy is the most important
factor determining future military power. This approach is
not surprising from a country that is ruled by a communist
party. In the Chinese Communist Party’s publication, Qiu
Shi, the director of the political department of the PLA’s
Guangzhou Military Region characterized the components
of national power as a combination of economic strength and
the “level of defense modernization” (guofang xiandaihua
3

shuiping).15 The emphasis on economic strength as a basis
for future defense modernization accounts for the relative
prioritization of military modernization as the last among
the now-formulaic “four modernizations.”16 Chinese leaders
believe that if resources are poured into military modernization at the expense of broader economic development, it
will lead to stagnation and a form of economic growth that is
not sustainable. The Chinese President, Communist Party
Chairman, and Central Military Commission Chairman
Jiang Zemin (in his address to the Communist Party’s 15th
Congress) also reflected this prioritization. Jiang made it
clear that the focus will be on the “economic, scientific and
technical” sphere rather than concentrating on strengthening China’s military power.17 This strategy was confirmed
in the second defense white paper by China, China’s
National Defense, published on July 27, 1998, in Beijing.
China’s large population, its lack of arable land, its
dwindling energy resources, and the burdens of supporting
an aging population from state resources require greater
attention to the problems of economic development over
military strength and modernization. Beijing’s strategy,
therefore, is to buy time for increasing China’s
military potential, which is slowly improving its
capacity to be a stronger military power.
Economic Issues.
Chinese leaders face many serious problems if they are
to maintain any economic growth. For instance, according to
the Far Eastern Economic Review, the ratio of the elderly
population dependent on working adults or the government
to support them will rise from 11 percent in 1990 to 22
percent in 2025.18 That increase places serious limits on
how much money the PLA can count on for its modernization. The plight of the more than 300,000 state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) also represents a serious financial
burden on China’s economy, one that will affect the
military. These SOEs, of which about a third are industrial,
employ (really they “under-employ”) more than 100 million
4

workers.19 They are operating at a loss of about 1 percent of
China’s GDP each year (in 1996, 50 percent of the
state-owned enterprises in China operated at a loss). Many
industrial workers are being paid in kind and told to sell
what they have produced on the open market; in other cases,
workers are paid only part of what they are owed. Worse
still, at some enterprises, the workers are simply told to go
out and find another job, while they are allowed to keep
their factory-owned houses. This represents a huge burden
on the Chinese economy. The problem of underemployment
and bankruptcy in state-owned enterprises is critical
because it limits the amount of funds China is able to devote
to military modernization.
The potential for labor unrest is high, and may be one of
the most volatile problems to confront the Chinese
leadership and the PLA.20 The one million-plus soldiers and
officers in the reserve forces of China’s military are
primarily in state-owned enterprises of one form of another.
For example, Beijing’s Capital Iron and Steel Company
(Shougang) and Shanghai’s Baoshan Iron and Steel each
incorporate a division-sized reserve unit. In northeast
China, not far from the North Korean border, the rubber tire
plant in Mudanjiang, which has operated there since before
World War II, contains its own reserve division. These are
really light infantry divisions of 8,000-10,000 soldiers
armed with small arms, machine guns, and artillery. Some
reserve divisions also have tanks and armored personnel
carriers. The specter of several such divisions turning
against the government has to be a frightening one for
China’s central political leadership and is a strong incentive
for sustaining the flow of funds into SOEs.21
Another volatile problem facing the central government
is China’s “floating population” of under-employed or
unemployed rural labor, numbering 100-120 million
people.22 Ian Johnson, writing in The Wall Street Journal,
notes that a recent Chinese government survey indicates
that 43 percent of China’s population live in cities; whereas,
only about 20 percent of the population were urban when
5

serious economic reforms began about 20 years ago in
1978-79.23 Most of these workers making up the floating
population are male; many have some form of military
training, either as militia or regular forces. The floating
population migrates into cities and works on construction
projects or as day laborers, performing jobs that the more
well-to-do urban residents shun. The laborers return to the
countryside from time to time or else send funds back to
their families. The importance of keeping this group
actively employed through continuous urban construction
projects is as obvious to the central leadership as it is a
burden on the economy.
China also faces the potential for a financial crisis of
serious magnitude. The centrally controlled banks of China
and the government have been subsidizing state-owned
enterprises with loans to prevent their collapse. Up to 90
percent of all loans granted to enterprises by state banks in
1996 went to SOEs, but these enterprises produce less than
40 percent of China’s industrial output. By the end of 1996,
according to the World Bank, the debt to the banks from
these enterprises was about $120 billion, almost equal to
China’s foreign reserves.24
The wage bill of state-owned industry is roughly equal to
the amount of direct foreign investment that comes into
China each year, and the debt of state-owned enterprises is
roughly equal to China’s foreign reserves.25 Clearly, if
China is to continue on its current path of economic
integration, the central leadership must remain linked to
the international economy. It also means that domestic
stability must be ensured because no foreign country or
banking house will invest in an unstable political
environment. When Chinese military and civilian leaders
say that their priority is economic growth and stability, they
mean it; the primary mission of the PLA, and the People’s
Armed Police (PAP) that it largely controls, is internal
security and stability.
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Still, the Chinese military is modernizing. Beijing is
spending its money carefully on military items. China has
purchased Su-27 fighter aircraft from Russia, Kilo-class
submarines, destroyers, and, through intermediaries, two
aircraft carriers, the Varyag and the Minsk, as models to
reverse engineer.26 To a large extent, however, the PLA is
“distracted” from its mission of external defense and a
serious military buildup by significant problems that eat up
a lot of resources. The PLA can live with fewer resources
because it saw what happened to the Soviet Union (total
collapse), when Moscow tried to beat the West in an arms
race. China’s military leaders are very realistic, however. To
compensate, they are working to develop the capacity to
control sea lines of communication, project regional force,
and deter the United States and other potential adversaries
in creative ways without matching forces.27
THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY
The PLA is the collective term for the ground forces,
strategic rocket forces, naval, and air forces of China. There
are about 2.8 million active duty officers and soldiers in the
PLA, but its total numbers can vary. Beijing has engaged in
a game of “smoke and mirrors” over the strength of the PLA.
When the Chinese government conducted a one
million-man reduction in the PLA in the 1980s, the PAP
grew by about 500,000 men to a current strength of 800,000.
More recently, despite the announced troop reductions in
the white paper Beijing issued on national defense, we have
seen entire divisions of the PLA change uniforms and
overnight become members of the PAP.28 The PAP is a
paramilitary organization controlled by the Central
Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party and
the Ministry of Public Security.
The Continental Emphasis.
China is a continental power, a fact that is reflected in its
massive ground force capability. For centuries, Chinese
7

leaders were concerned about consolidating their control
over the populace on the Asian mainland. Historically
China’s leaders devoted little effort to naval expansion or
maritime issues.29 Of the 24 combat armies of the PLA, 17
are deployed in the north and northeast of China, positioned
to defend the traditional invasion routes and to repel the
traditional enemies China has faced—Russia from the
north, and Japan and the Western powers over the Korean
Peninsula and from the east. Most of the research and
development money devoted to new weapon systems for the
Chinese military is going to the air force and the navy, but
two-thirds of the PLA is devoted to land power. That figure
goes up to 75 percent if the light infantry divisions of the
PAP are counted as part of the PLA. Beijing has the luxury
of choosing whether to concentrate on defending its littoral
waters, focusing on naval force projection in an effort to
become a maritime power, or maintaining its continental
orientation. Clearly, today China defines its military power
through its Army.
Beijing’s strategic orientation is important when
making judgements about future potential. A nation will
seek to develop military capabilities to defend what its
leaders see as the important interests of the country. The
current national strategy of China calls for the development
of national strength through economic and scientific
development. The main goal of China, according to the
report by Jiang Zemin at the 15th Communist Party
Congress, is to build a “socialist economy.”30 The challenge
for Chinese leaders is to spread the primarily coastal
economic development inland. Two ways China is doing this
is to expand trade, telecommunications, and transportation
from China’s Sichuan and Guizhou Provinces southwest
into Vietnam’s northern highlands, Laos, and Burma; and
to expand trade and commerce west through Xinjiang and
into Central Asia.
At the annual Kunming Trade Show, for example, the
small border counties and provinces of Burma (Myanmar),
Laos, and Vietnam are heavily represented selling food8

stuffs, light industrial goods, and textiles to residents of
Sichuan. Kunming, in fact, has become something of a hub
for the economic development of the region. Boeing Aircraft
Corporation, partnered with another U.S. firm, Flight
Safety, has established a regional flight simulation center
there, hoping to draw regional airline pilots there for training. These are positive steps that have the potential to
contribute to the economic development of China and its
neighbors. The old French-built rail lines into Laos and
Vietnam are operating again, and road links are being
developed. China’s economic development and integration
with Burma is also strengthening. The old World War IIvintage “Burma Road” has been expanded to a four-lane
highway in some places and rail lines are being installed
between Kunming and Rangoon. In addition, China is
building a port complex in Rangoon to facilitate shipping.
This outlet on the Bay of Bengal is designed to serve as the
transshipment point for goods from south China.
In the west, to develop Xinjiang and to secure an
alternative source of oil, China has agreed with Kazakhstan
to develop and build a major oil shipment pipeline. Along
with this pipeline, Beijing will improve the rail and road
links to the west. Kazakhstan has the potential to become a
new zone of competition among China, the European
powers, Russia, and the United States. By 2010, China may
require imports of as many as 7 million barrels a day of oil,
some of which could come through the Kazakhstan pipeline.
Investing in the oil fields there is a strategic move on
China’s part that will surely also include the installation of
fiber-optic cable to improve telecommunications and control
rail traffic.31 Central Asia is also something of an agricultural basin. Agriculture accounts for between 37 percent
and 60 percent of the net material products of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
Although China today is self-sufficient in grain, the World
Bank predicts that by the year 2020 China will need to
import between 30 million and 90 million metric tons of
grain annually. Good transportation links with countries
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that have small populations, but an abundance of arable
land like the Central Asian republics will be important in
the future. Beijing plans to lay four oil and gas pipelines
from Central Asia and Russia into China for a total cost of
$12.5 billion. China will build a 1,000-kilometer pipeline
from the Uzen oil field in Kazakhstan through
Turkmenistan and Iran to the Persian Gulf.32
Clearly, China has launched a number of commercial
trade activities that will simultaneously improve the
regional military lines of communication. Once a nation
develops vital economic interests in a region, by necessity it
will factor those interests into its security equation and
build a capability to secure and defend them. A careful
reading of both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu will tell us this. It is
simply a fact of history and geopolitics.
For the United States Army, these matters affect most
seriously the U.S. presence in the Republic of Korea. With
an infantry division stationed on the Korean Peninsula,
U.S. Army planners and government policymakers must
remain continually mindful of China’s presence. Senior
Chinese military officials have told American officers that,
even in the event of a collapse of North Korea, neither the
United States nor South Korea (ROK) should believe that
China will simply sit back and watch the ROK and U.S.
armies march north, approaching the Chinese border.
Referring back to Chinese volunteers crossing the Yalu
River in 1950, several Chinese military leaders have made
it clear that China should be “consulted and involved” in any
humanitarian operations in North Korea.33
While China continues to insist that it may use force to
reunite Taiwan and the Mainland, and makes veiled
threats against U.S. forces in Korea, it would be foolhardy
for the United States Army to engage in military-to-military
exchanges that would improve the PLA’s ability to project
force. The manner in which China has used its army (and its
PAP) as a force to repress popular movements and dissent,
as during the Cultural Revolution and in the 1989 Tianan-
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men Square demonstrations in Beijing, strains army-toarmy contacts. Just as the U.S. Army must avoid increasing
the capabilities of the PLA to project force against China’s
neighbors and Taiwan, it must remain sensitive to bilateral
programs that improve the PLA’s ability to repress the
Chinese population. Chinese military leaders are also
especially sensitive to U.S. exercises around China’s
periphery. When the 82d Airborne Division conducted an
exercise with the Kazakh Army, dropping an airborne
battalion into Kazakhstan, PLA leaders interpreted this as
potentially hostile. The PLA is also wary of humanitarian
missions in Mongolia, where China remains sensitive to
U.S. military activities.34
The Military Potential of the Ground Forces.
China’s military strength lies in its ground forces, and,
despite an antiquated military and a fragile economy, if
China’s military potential is likely to be realized anywhere,
it is on the continent of Asia. The PLA of the future must
have the potential to dominate and control terrain, lines of
transportation and commerce, population centers, and
populations in support of China’s national interests.
PLA leaders are realistic about the resources they will
probably get to improve their military capabilities. They
realize that one-third of China’s ground forces leave active
duty each year, so they cannot count on a military composed
of a large body of experienced professional soldiers who are
well trained to handle sophisticated equipment. The PLA’s
leaders also realize that most of the soldiers who enter the
army are peasants with a poor education. Therefore,
conscious of their weaknesses, they are concentrating on
what we would call “asymmetric warfare.” This means that
the PLA will not seek to match or mirror the forces of any
potential adversary.35 PLA leaders will also analyze how to
use technology to complement its strengths. If only a third of
the PLA is trained at any time, it will practice putting
together smaller building blocks of forces, perhaps of
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brigade instead of division size, that are fully trained.
Instead of seeing fully digitized divisions, as is the goal in
the United States, the PLA may build up smaller units of
highly educated soldiers and officers to support main force
armies. These “information/electronics/modernization”
support units will probably be drawn from more educated
urban recruits who serve longer careers. They will probably
be trained to attack the command and communications
systems of advanced armies. But every PLA Group Army
may not require such a capability. The Group Armies that
are to fight potential battles in Southeast Asia or Central
Asia would not need as much “high-tech” equipment. Group
Armies on the border with Korea, where there are still U.S.
forces, and opposite Taiwan, may be structured differently.
The thinkers and strategists of the PLA have grasped
the “intellectual side of military modernization.” They have
focused the war-fighting debate in China on limited
technological improvements in areas like reconnaissance
and sensor systems, electronic warfare and jamming,
destroying enemy command and control systems with “logic
bombs,” and the use of short-range missile systems to attack
an adversary.36 This sophisticated modernization effort is
designed to bring at least some of China’s combat divisions
to a world-class level.37 The effort is modeled on what the
Chinese military saw the United States do during the Gulf
War; that is, to increase knowledge and awareness of the
battlefield, to conduct simultaneous operations deep in
enemy territory as well as along areas of contact, and to
attack an enemy’s key competencies and strengths without
exposing one’s own weaknesses. The other driving force for
military modernization, the “manifest destiny” to reunite
Taiwan and the Mainland by force if necessary, has led to
other modernization plans.
Some skeptics will ask: “Can the PLA assimilate these
techniques?” Between 1979 and 1983, after studying and
working out the doctrines and concepts in the U.S.
“Air-Land Battle” system, the PLA managed to transition
from a force that could conduct only sequential, single-arm
12

(artillery, infantry, armor) operations, to a force that could
conduct integrated, combined-arms operations on the
battlefield. Then, after some experimentation on the use of
helicopters, between 1984 and 1990, the PLA was able to
successfully incorporate air-mobile (heliborne) operations
into the tactics of some of its group armies. After watching
the Gulf War and rethinking its doctrines again, between
1991 and 1995, the PLA began to grasp simultaneous
operations in various forms of battle-space (air, undersea,
sea surface, and space with missiles). The 1996 demonstrations of force against Taiwan showed what the PLA had
accomplished. They used a force of ships, paratroopers,
amphibious troops and marines, and aircraft in the
exercises supported by sophisticated jamming and shortrange ballistic missiles. Using its older platforms, type 69
and other Russian-derived tanks, the PLA integrated new
laser range finders and night vision technologies into its
ground force tactics. For limited numbers of divisions, and
using limited assets, the PLA has demonstrated that it can
incorporate new technologies and employ them on the
battlefield.
At the August 1997 exhibition in the Military Museum in
Beijing, designed to commemorate the 70th anniversary of
the PLA, China teased observers with a limited view of what
it would like to produce to improve the lethality and force
projection capabilities of its military. On display were a
combination of systems that, if mass-produced and fielded,
would give the Chinese ground forces the ability to sustain
forces away from bases of supply without relying on the old
methods of “People’s War” where combat forces were
sustained by local militia. Included in the displays at the
exhibition were significantly improved field mess (kitchen)
systems to feed and sustain deployed troops; forward area
refueling points for armored warfare and airmobile, or
helicopter-borne forces; and the sort of sensor-to-shooter
target acquisition systems that depend on remotely piloted
vehicles linked to a sophisticated intelligence and communications architecture. Combined with global position-
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ing satellites, these sensor-to-shooter systems would permit
the PLA to target enemy forces in deeper battle space on a
real-time basis with cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, or air
strikes.
These improvements would permit the PLA to more
effectively maneuver and support combat forces in such
places as along the strategic lines of communications into
Xinjiang, Central Asia, Vietnam and Burma. More
importantly, the systems displayed would permit better
sustainment and logistics for these forces and improved
“battlefield awareness,” something that was severely
lacking in China’s 1979 attack into Vietnam.38
China’s leaders may claim their intentions are peaceful
and defensive; but if economic collapse threatens because of
the loss of markets or resources on which China has come to
depend, Beijing will use military force to defend its vital
interests as quickly as it used military force to crush
domestic political threats to regime survival in the Cultural
Revolution, and in Tianamen Square in 1989. Beijing has
acted responsibly to assist in securing regional stability on
the Korean Peninsula. But where its vital interests were at
stake, it gave Pakistan a nuclear and missile capability to be
used against China’s long-term rival for power—India.
When it saw that Vietnamese forces were poised to crush
the Khmer Rouge supported by China in Cambodia and
threaten Thailand, China attacked Vietnam.
One cannot know just how advanced the PLA is in
employing its force projection systems, but if the systems
engineering and production capabilities of the Chinese
national defense industries develop, the PLA will be a
significantly more capable force, able to dominate Taiwan or
other regional opponents. In the more open terrain of the
steppes of Central Asia, the PLA could well have the type of
forces that the United States fielded in the Gulf War against
Iraq. Building that type of force is one of the goals of China’s
military leaders.39
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Maritime Potential.
China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea require
a navy that can sustain itself away from shore, air defenses,
and air cover for the fleet. The gradual improvement of the
naval forces of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) has been severely retarded by the recent financial
crisis there, but one country in Asia continues its
methodical military buildup, annual increases in its defense
budget, and serious purchases of foreign military
equipment—China. Beijing continues to pursue maritime
dominance. As in its policy toward Taiwan, Beijing has
refused to foreswear the use of force to resolve territorial
claims in the South China Sea. In fact, China’s own
territorial law charges the PLA with enforcing territorial
claims in the South China Sea.
Beijing’s interest in the waters around the Spratly
Islands is not primarily for military significance. The
energy resources and fishing rights in the area are Beijing’s
long-term targets. But the fact that major sea lines of
communication pass near the Spratly Islands makes the
potential for conflict there of strategic significance and a
concern for the United States. Serious conflict could disrupt
international shipping and commerce. China’s maritime
requirements drive the acquisition of modern aircraft and
modern ships like the Russian Sovremmeny destroyers. The
acquisition of an air-to-air refueling capability will give the
PLA Navy the capability to support naval deployments in
the Spratlys, while China is working to build its own
aircraft carrier.
More seriously, Beijing’s goal of uniting Taiwan with the
Mainland is driving other military efforts aimed at
deterring any decision to declare independence on Taiwan.
Looking once more at the systems on display at the August
1997 Military Museum exhibitions, the PLA’s efforts
translate into the development of a logistics across the shore
capability to support amphibious operations; better
coordination of the use of airborne, special operating forces,
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and amphibious forces; and the integration of air power and
ballistic missiles to cripple Taiwan’s transportation and
communications infrastructure without committing ground
forces. China learned about “stand-off operations” from
watching the U.S. effort in the 1991 Gulf War. As for aircraft
carriers, the former Soviet carrier reported to have been
purchased through Macao will probably be a test bed for
replication, while the PLA Navy uses the Russian carrier
purchased for scrap from South Korea to master other
design features. Beijing is working to develop the potential
to project naval forces that can dominate parts of the Indian
and Pacific Oceans.
Beijing’s goals are regional domination and hegemony,
not world conquest.40 Beijing wants to ensure that no other
Asian or Pacific state acts without having to consider
China’s potential response.41 The PRC is the dominant
country on the Asian continent and seeks that dominance in
the waters of Asia. At present, China’s ships cannot sustain
themselves at sea for extended periods. The ships are not
designed to distill sufficient fresh water to sustain the crew
at sea for extended periods. China can dominate the navies
of the ASEAN states, but, despite the examination of
aircraft carriers by the PLA Navy, there does not seem to be
a naval construction effort underway that would give China
the potential to decisively project sea power. On average, it
has taken China approximately 15 years to develop and
produce new classes of ships.42 By comparison, Japan just
took delivery of four very capable amphibious assault ships
produced at home in only 3 years. If China is to evolve into a
major power at sea, its industrial system must massproduce dependable, deployable systems at a faster rate. 43
Potential Air Power.
China has really produced only one indigenous combat
aircraft that was not completely modeled after some Soviet
design, the A-5 “Fantan” fighter-bomber. It is built with
1950s and 1960s design and incorporates old technology. It
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took between 10-15 years to bring this aircraft from design
to production.44 However, China is actively pursuing the
development of several air power capabilities, focusing on
asymmetric means instead of completely matching the air
forces of its neighbors or the United States. Rather than try
to completely modernize its old airframes, Beijing is
working with Italy to improve the radar and avionics of its
F-8 (an upgraded MIG-21) to give the aircraft the capability
to fire sophisticated air-to-air missiles and, if linked to other
systems, to fire over-the-horizon cruise missiles. In the
aviation field, also, the PLA is working to ensure that it has
a modern military potential. With Russian and Israeli help,
the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is building airborne early
warning aircraft utilizing radar that will vector aircraft
over land and water, while providing radar data links to
target air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles on Russianprovided fighters. In order to ensure better on-station time
over the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait area, the
PLAAF is also working with our British and Israeli friends
to develop and field an air-to-air refueling capability stand
off attack.
Right now, the Chinese Air Force is able to equip a few of
its aircraft with missiles copied from the French Exocet, the
missile that did so much damage to the USS Stark in the
Persian Gulf, the C-801 and C-802 air-to-surface and
surface-to-surface missiles. But Beijing still lacks the
capacity to do over-the-horizon targeting in order to employ
the C-802 at its capability. If it purchases Russian Su-30s to
complement its Su-27s, or gains the airborne early warning
capability from an AWACS-like aircraft, the PLA gains this
capacity. Although the PLA still cannot build terrain,
contour modeling ground attack missiles like the U.S.
Tomahawk , the PLA is very impressed with their
performance. China’s military leaders would like to be able
to hit a target from 1,500 miles away, as they saw the United
States do in Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan, and they are
working to develop the capability.
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ASSIMILATING NEW TECHNOLOGY
The evidence is mixed when attempting to assess
whether the PLA and Chinese defense industries can
assimilate new technology. Beijing needs medium
technology components for its armored vehicles and has
depen ded on forei gn c ountr i es f or the engi nes,
transmissions, drive trains, and weapon sensor systems.
But the PLA has yet to be able to develop an indigenous
turbine engine-transmission system for its armored
vehicles. Assistance from Germany, Great Britain, the
United States (before 1989), Russia, and the Ukraine failed
to help China’s defense industries in this endeavor.45 In
May 1998, the PLA tried to get access to world-class,
modern defense electronics by sponsoring a Defense
Electronics Exhibition in Beijing. This show was the
product of a 2-year effort originated in the Commission of
Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense and
the Electronic Warfare Department of the PLA General
Staff Department. But it was delayed for almost 2 years
from its conception by bureaucratic in-fighting among
several SOEs and ministries in China. The experience of the
planners for the Defense Electronics Exhibition demonstrates what may be the greatest impediment faced by
China in incorporating new technology and developing new
systems—the weight of its own bureaucracy and the
seeming inability to change.46
The best example of how China’s management system
and bureaucracy seem to defy change and innovation is
probably in the book by former The Los Angeles Times
correspondent to China, Jim Mann. In Beijing Jeep, Jim
Mann documents the problems in quality control and
management encountered by the Jeep Corporation in
establishing a joint venture to assemble kits in China.47
Simple assembly line processes and quality control are alien
concepts to Chinese managers. Even today, years after the
Jeep plant in China began operation, one can still see newly
assembled Jeep Cherokees all over China with doors hung
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improperly and that don’t close flush. China still makes a
motorcycle from the same assembly line that produced the
1937 BMW used by the German Army in World War II. But
all Chinese that operate the motorcycles will advise that one
should buy a used rather than a new one because the
bearings invariably go bad within the first 1,000 kilometers
of use.
Examples more relevant to the defense sector can be
found in China’s attempts to develop a new destroyer using
General Electric LM 2500 gas turbine engines. The ships
were designed and partially built before Chinese naval
engineers discovered that they had designed engine spaces
too small to accommodate the engines.48 A 1989 visit to the
Changxindian Armored Vehicle Plant south of Beijing by
the U.S. Defense Science Board was also revealing. Despite
the presence of modern, four-axis milling machines in the
plant, Chinese workers were carefully filing and milling
cylinders and bearings for armored personnel carriers by
hand. When one U.S. industrial engineer, through an
interpreter, asked a workman why the automated
machinery wasn’t used, the worker responded that he had
been trained by his own father to do the work by hand. The
automated equipment had never been used.
Perhaps the most relevant examples of the seeming
inability of the Chinese industrial bureaucracy to
accommodate change and innovation is that provided by a
U.S. manager from a major aerospace corporation who deals
regularly with three Chinese aircraft companies. Although
the Chinese workers are able to master good sub-assembly
processes on parts for the United States, they require
continuous supervision by Western quality assurance
specialists. According to the U.S. corporate manufacturing
representative, the fear of failure by Chinese engineers and
workers prevents them from developing any product
improvement ideas. Chinese engineers and workers will
duplicate anything they are given, but won’t innovate or
create. This fear of innovation, according to the American,
stems from the system of criticism and punishment by
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Communist Party organizations built into the Chinese
corporate structure in SOEs.49 Part of the problem with
Chinese manufacturing, according to the U.S. aircraft
corporation representative, is that industrial management
in China still relies on 1950s Soviet styles. This involves
“batch building” a full order of aircraft in advance based on a
state-planned and dictated order for parts and materials. As
a consequence of this system, there are no direct lines of
accountability for quality control, and no cost-cutting
discussions or steps available to mid-level management.
There is no competitive bidding for contracts, workers are
redundant, and schedules continually slip because state
planning doesn’t have a fixed required-delivery date for
products. If production is late, the state plan is simply
revised. China’s older engineers are so immersed in this
system that they seem unable to change their ways. At the
same time, according to this experienced observer, China’s
own cultural superiority keeps Chinese engineers from
accepting change. Young managers stay risk-averse and are
reluctant to change or improve on the system. The future of
China’s industry was painted as so bleak by the individual
that I interviewed that he characterized China’s aircraft
industry as containing “pockets of adequacy, but no pockets
of excellence.”
Despite all of these problems, China is still working hard
to build a powerful military. The implications of this effort
for the United States are quite serious in the long term.
CAN THE CHINESE GET IT ALL TOGETHER?
The short answer is probably not! The greater likelihood
is that Beijing will be overcome by the economic and
internal problems China faces. Skeptics like Kenneth Allen,
in his 1995 book on the Chinese Air Force for the Rand
Corporation; Robert Ross, in his rejoinder to Munro and
Bernstien in Foreign Affairs; and Ehsan Ahrari, writing in
Jane’s Intelligence Review, doubt that China can bring to
fruition its military modernization plans. Indeed, as this
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monograph points out, there are considerable economic,
structural, and technological impediments restricting
China’s defense sector. However, it is prudent to plan on the
likelihood that China will accomplish in the military realm
what it has managed in some sectors of civil industry.
The example of Zhang Ruimin and the Hai’er Group is
most instructive in this regard. Perhaps the most wellknown and most reliable air conditioning systems, heating
and refrigeration equipment made in China today come
from Hai’er. In 1984, as the story goes, Zhang Ruimin took
over a failing, collectively-owned refrigerator plant in
China’s industrial northeast and turned it into a stable,
thriving, multinational enterprise selling what are
arguably the best, most reliable products in the refrigeration sector in China with warrantees, a network of
repairmen, and parts and service guarantees that work.
Zhang did this by starting out with serious quality control.
He destroyed products that would not pass inspection and
penalized his first-line managers for shoddy work. He also
fired people that wouldn’t produce. He added systems
engineering and integration. Moreover, he instituted a
warranty and ensured that there was a network of
repairmen and spare parts to install and repair Hai’er
products if there were malfunctions.50
After cornering the air conditioner market in the northeast with the assistance of a Japanese joint venture partner,
Zhang Ruimin expanded into other parts of China.
Continuing the same warranty service and spare parts
program, Zhang built Hai’er into one of the most successful
companies in China.
In a competitive salary and market environment, what if
Zhang Ruimin could be attracted into the military aircraft
manufacturing industry? What happens if Zhang, or a
manager like him, who understands management, quality
control, a good work ethic, systems engineering, and quality
service, takes over China’s aircraft carrier project? We
already know that someone like Zhang is in charge of the

21

short range and medium range ballistic missile program,
mass-producing effective M-9 and M-11 missiles that can be
armed with nuclear warheads. Some other very effective
manager is producing sea and air-launched cruise missiles
(C-801 and 802). Soon, with airborne data links, the PLA
will master over-the-horizon targeting. When it does, the
Chinese armed forces may not be a threat to the U.S.
homeland, but the PLA will threaten deployed U.S. ground
forces and U.S. naval battle groups. When China develops
land-contour modeling cruise missiles like the U.S.
Tomahawk, with a 1500-mile range, it will have a serious
land attack capability.
When we think about China’s military potential, we
should really keep in mind just how quickly good management and leadership transformed one air conditioning
company. It took Zhang Ruimin from 1984 to 1989. Japan
took less than 3 years to produce an 8,900-ton amphibious
assault ship capable of moving at 22 knots and transporting
330 troops. It is conceivable that China could do the same,
given a good management team. The modernization and
improvement of China’s civil industry will have these kinds
of spin-offs for the defense sector. Therefore, notwithstanding all of the obstacles China faces, China’s military
potential bears watching. It is not difficult to contemplate
China’s becoming a regional hegemonic power in the 21st
century.
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